1. 研究课题（中文）：战权之争与美国的对外战争决策

 

1．选题意义和价值

由于宪法确立了分权和制衡体制，在美国建国两百多年来所进行的大大小小的对外战争中，总统与国会关于战争决策权的斗争一直持续不断，美国的对外战争决策实践和决策模式也呈现出复杂多变的特点，有时是总统提请国会宣战，有时是国会敦促总统开战，有时总统可能不经国会同意或批准直接发动战争，有时却又不能不征得国会批准或授权，而有时国会也会拒绝总统的作战要求或限制总统进行战争，那么，总统与国会在战争决策中的地位和作用到底如何？他们在战争决策中又有哪些互动模式？什么情况下总统会提请国会宣战或授权开战？什么情况下总统又会绕开国会单独开战？什么情况下国会会敦促或要求总统开战？什么情况下国会会宣战或授权开战？什么情况下国会又会避免或限制开战呢？研究总统与国会关于战争决策权力的斗争以及美国的对外战争决策实践不但可以考察美国的战争决策过程和决策模式，而且可以更加深入地了解美国外交政策制订过程中总统与国会的相互作用和影响。

２．国内外研究现状

越战以来，特别是1973年国会越过总统否决通过《战权决议》以后，对战争决策权之争的研究在美国学界成为热点，但美国学者的研究大多是从宪法或法律角度进行讨论或围绕《战权决议》进行个案研究，其着眼点往往在于总统和国会谁应拥有战争决策权力的法律或政治论争，摒弃个人立场对美国对外战争决策实践和决策模式的综合历史研究并不多见。国内目前对此问题的研究多限于对战争权力之争特别是对《战权决议》的一般性介绍，对美国的对外战争决策实践和决策模式也鲜有比较全面或深入的研究成果。本课题的目的就在于从一定程度上弥补现有研究之不足。

３．主要研究内容

本项研究的主要内容将围绕以下三个方面进行，首先是战争决策权之争的法律框架和总统与国会对相关法律条文的不同解读。战争决策权之争的根源在于美国宪法的分权和制衡原则，宪法对大部分战争权力进行了明确的划分，但在决策权的归属上并不十分明确，从而导致行政与立法部门对宪法条文解读不一，在实践中引发了持续不断的府院之争。二战以后，《联合国宪章》以及《里约热内卢条约》、《北大西洋公约》、《东南亚共同防御条约》等同盟条约的签署都涉及到战争决策权力问题并引发争论，国会亦先后通过《联合国参与法案》及《战权决议》，试图对战争决策权力加以明确，但结果仍然是总统与国会对相关法律条文各自解读，使战争决策权之争更为复杂。而负责解释宪法和联邦法律的法院则竭力置身事外，以各种理由回避对战争决策权的归属做出判决，遂致府院之争无休无止。

其次，本课题将重点分析考察美国战争决策实践在各个历史时期的发展变化及其国际国内政治背景，从中揭示战争决策权力和战争决策模式的历史演变。目前拟分三个大的阶段进行考察和分析，第一个阶段从美国建国到美国公开参加二战，期间战争决策经历了由国会把持发展到总统开始采取主动行动的衍变过程；第二个阶段从朝鲜战争到国会通过《战权决议》，期间经历了越战以前总统决策权力的扩张、越战中后期国会重申决策权力并起草和通过《战权决议》以限制总统等过程；第三个阶段从《战权决议》生效到目前的伊拉克战争，期间历任总统均拒绝承认《战权决议》合法有效，并在实践中以各种方式和借口予以回避或拒不执行。

最后，本课题将对总统和国会在战争决策过程中的互动模式以及决定互动模式的国内外因素进行分析总结，同时对战争决策权之争的性质及未来发展进行试探性定位和分析。

4．创新之处

本研究的创新之处在于，其一，如前所述，现有研究多从宪法和法律角度入手，视野多囿于美国国内政治，陷于谁应拥有战争决策权的争论，作者对历史案例的解读也会因个人立场而有失客观，本研究则从战争决策角度入手，着眼于美国对外战争决策实践和决策模式的发展变化，并把决策权之争放置到国际政治环境和国内政治环境双重背景下加以考察，且无立场影响之虞；其二，以往的历史研究因上述原因往往限于高度概括的描述，缺乏对战争决策实践的综合历史研究和具体详实的府院互动过程研究，个案研究也多数着眼于以个案支撑作者对《战权决议》的看法，本研究则以“府院政治互动过程”研究模式为主要分析工具，用战争决策案例中府院互动过程的具体研究支持对战争决策权之争的综合历史分析，既避免只有概括描述而无具体过程分析的弊端，也可达到进行综合历史分析的目的。

5．研究方法

本研究将以历史分析和案例分析为主要研究方法，以“府院政治互动过程”研究模式为主要分析工具，在两个层面上进行分析研究：对战争决策权之争和战争决策实践的历史综合研究及对战争决策案例的具体分析考察。

 

2. Research Proposal:

War Power Struggle and American War Decision-making

Due to the constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances, there has been constant struggle over war power and war decision-making between the President and Congress in all the major and minor wars ever since the founding of the United States. In fact, the struggle has constituted an essential part of presidential-congressional struggle over foreign policy powers and foreign policy-making. Therefore, researches on the subject would be of academic as well as practical value in that they would not only provide insights into American war decision-making but also facilitate a better understanding of the interplay between the President and Congress in foreign policy-making.

Since the Vietnam War, war power struggle has become a focus of scholarly attention in the American academia. Yet most present publications are either researches from a constitutional or legal approach or case studies centering round the War Powers Resolution. The authors tend to concentrate on the constitutional and political debate of who should wield the power of war, and they almost invariably take sides. There have been very few up-to-date unbiased comprehensive historical studies of war decision-making at the inter-branch level (or it might be termed as war power practice). The study of war power struggle and war power practice in China is just at a beginning stage. So far most publications are introductory in nature and they usually focus on the War Powers Resolution. No detailed or comprehensive study has been made. This project is an effort to make up for these deficiencies.

This project is intended to be a comprehensive historical study of war power struggle and war power practice over the course of more than two hundred years since 1789. It will comprise both a comprehensive study of the evolution of war power practice and a detailed investigation into the international and domestic causes of such evolution. The causes and means of presidential aggrandizement and the causes of congressional tolerance or resilience will be analyzed and summarized. So will be the patterns of presidential-congressional interplay in war decision-making and the relevant variables. In undertaking the research, “the inter-branch politics model” will be employed as the primary analytical tool. The major research methods to be adopted are descriptive historical analysis and case study. Accordingly, analysis will be conducted at two levels: comprehensive historical analysis of war power struggle and war power practice, and detailed process analysis of decision-making in specific cases.

Following will be the major contents of the project:

First, the constitutional and legal framework of war power will be analyzed, together with the struggle over interpretation. The root of war power struggle is the constitutional principle of separation of powers and checks and balances. The Constitution, while making a clear division of the majority of war powers, leaves some ambiguity over the power to decide on war, thus enabling different interpretations by the executive and legislative departments and leading to persistent struggle between them. After WWII, the United Nations Charter, the mutual-defense treaties like the Rio Treaty, the NATO Treaty, and the SEATO Treaty all involved war power and gave rise to repeated controversies. Congress, in its efforts to set up clear procedures for the use of war power, first passed the UN Participation Act in 1945 and then enacted the War Powers Resolution in 1973. However, in practice both the executive and the legislative departments maintained the practice of interpreting these laws in their own terms and favor, thus complicating rather than solving the inter-branch conflict. And the judicial department, although in charge of interpreting the Constitution and federal laws, has successfully kept itself from involvement in the struggle by employing various technicalities to abstain from ruling on war power cases between the other two branches.

Next, a comprehensive study of war power struggle and war power practice in different historical periods, tentatively divided into three major phases, will be conducted to demonstrate the evolution of the patterns of presidential-congressional interplay in war decision-making. The first phase will cover early experience till WWII, during which time war power practice evolved from congressional dominance to presidential initiative. The second phase will cover a period from the Korean War till the War Powers Resolution, which witnessed the evolution from presidential expansion to congressional reassertion. The third phase will start from the enactment of the War Powers Resolution till the present Iraq War, during which time all presidents have declined to acknowledge the legality of the War Powers Resolution and have tried one way or another to avoid its regulations, yet still they sometimes have to seek congressional support before starting wars.

Last, the phases, causes and means of presidential expansion will be analyzed and summarized. Similar analysis and summary will be made of the patterns of presidential-congressional interplay in war decision-making and the relevant variables.

This project will bring innovation to the study of war power struggle and war power practice in two aspects. First, as noted above, most present works are from a constitutional or legal approach, studying the subject within the context of domestic politics, invariably taking sides in the debate of who should wield war power, and with their case studies suffering from personal stands. Approaching the subject from the perspective of decision-making and setting it within the context of both international and domestic circumstances, this project will focus on the war power practices of the United States and the evolution of its decision-making patterns. And it will be free from the adverse effects of personal stands. Second, due to the above reasons, most present historical studies are highly generalized descriptions lacking in comprehensive study and in the processes of interplay between the President and Congress. Also, most case studies are conducted for the purpose of supporting personal opinions on the War Powers Resolution. Employing the inter-branch politics model as the primary analytical tool, this project will try to make up for these deficiencies by supporting comprehensive historical study with detailed analysis of the processes of interplay in each specific case.